This was because, (i) as was clear from the information available at the time of it making that decision (and for a considerable time thereafter) the applicant was not (and would not be) at risk of being expelled and subjected to treatment allegedly in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, and (ii) the applicant could challenge before the domestic authorities any removal order issued in the future (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, § 74, ECHR 2016, with further references, and M.S.A. v. Russia [Committee], no. 29957/14 and 8 others, §§ 32-33, 12 December 2017).

Nor can it be found that the cumulative effect of the other aspects of the detention which the applicant complained about reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 (compare with the Court's findings in respect of the same detention facility at the relevant period of time, Mskhiladze v. Russia, no. 47741/16, §§ 38-39, 13 February 2018, and contrast with the Court's findings in respect of a previous period, Kim v. Russia, no. 44260/13, §§ 17-22, 31-35, 17 July 2014, and M.S.A. and Others v. Russia, no. 29957/14 and 8 others, § 58, 12 December 2017).

Accordingly, the Court considers that the Article 5 complaint lodged by the applicant later in the proceedings does not constitute a mere elaboration on his original complaints to the Court, and therefore it is not appropriate to deal with this newly raised matter in the present case (see, in identical circumstances, M.S.A. and Others v. Russia, nos. 29957/14 and 8 others, § 60, 21 November 2017, and Rafig Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 45875/06, §§ 69-70, 6 December 2011, with further references).