Auszug aus EGMR, 03.05.2016 - 1955/14

Although the applicant argued before the domestic courts that the local authority's proposed actions amounted to a deprivation of property under the second rule, as stated in the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he has only argued before this Court that the local authority's decision to block vehicular access to his property amounted to a control of the use of property in accordance with the general interest under the third rule, as stated in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (for information on the three rules see, among other authorities, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, § 61, Series A no. 52; James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 37, Series A no. 98; and Depalle, cited above, § 77).

Auszug aus EGMR, 03.05.2016 - 1955/14

Turning to the accessibility, precision and foreseeability of the applicable provisions of domestic law (see, mutatis mutandis, Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, §§ 85-90, Series A no. 61), the Court first finds that the relevant statutory provisions were adequately accessible because the powers on which the local authority proposed to rely, namely those provided in section 80 - or, in the alternative, in section 66 - of the Highways Act 1980, were set out in clear terms and published.

Auszug aus EGMR, 03.05.2016 - 1955/14

Taking into account its limited power to review compliance with domestic law (see Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, 21 February 1990, § 47, Series A no. 171-A, and more recently Beyeler, cited above, § 108), in the present case the Court notes that the national courts - in the last resort the Supreme Court, the highest court in the land - held that the interference in question had a basis in domestic law, in that the local authority's actions were permitted by section 80 of the Highways Act 1980.

Auszug aus EGMR, 03.05.2016 - 1955/14

Furthermore, there is nothing in the material before the Court which suggests either that the decisions of the national authorities, notably the courts, were contrary to domestic law (see Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 7 July 1989, § 58, Series A no. 159) or from which it can conclude that those authorities applied the relevant domestic law manifestly erroneously or so as to reach arbitrary conclusions (see Beyeler, cited above, § 108).

Auszug aus EGMR, 03.05.2016 - 1955/14

Although the applicant argued before the domestic courts that the local authority's proposed actions amounted to a deprivation of property under the second rule, as stated in the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he has only argued before this Court that the local authority's decision to block vehicular access to his property amounted to a control of the use of property in accordance with the general interest under the third rule, as stated in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (for information on the three rules see, among other authorities, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, § 61, Series A no. 52; James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 37, Series A no. 98; and Depalle, cited above, § 77).