Auszug aus EGMR, 15.05.2008 - 31283/04

This judgment was rendered after the guiding judgments by the European Court of 11 February 2003 in Y. v. Norway [cited above] and Ringvold v. Norway [no. 34964/97, ECHR 2003-II].

However, in a landmark ruling of 1996 concerning civil liability for forced sexual intercourse (Norsk Retstidende 1996, p. 864, at p. 876; Ringvold v. Norway, no. 34964/97, §§ 16-19, ECHR 2003-II) the Norwegian Supreme Court held that the requirement as to the strength of the evidence had to be stricter than that which applied to the test of the balance of probabilities, bearing in mind the burden which an allegation of reprehensible conduct might have for the defendant and the serious consequences it might have for his or her reputation.

The Court will examine the applicant's complaint in the light of the principles enunciated in its case-law (see Ringvold v. Norway, no. 34964/97, § 36, ECHR 2003-II; and Y. v. Norway, no. 56568/00, § 39 ECHR 2003-II (extracts) and its application of those principles in those cases (see respectively at paragraphs 37-42 and 40-47 of the said judgments).

It referred especially to the guiding, as it called them, judgments of this Court in Y v. Norway, (no. 56568/00, ECHR 2003-II (extracts)) and Ringvold v. Norway, (no. 34964/97, ECHR 2003-II), both decided a year earlier, in which it was held that both the procedural and the evidentiary parts of the Norwegian system were not incompatible with Article 6 § 2.

Auszug aus EGMR, 15.05.2008 - 31283/04

In this connection the applicant relied on the Court's judgment of 11 February 2003 in Y. v. Norway (no. 56568/00, ECHR 2003-II).

The Court will examine the applicant's complaint in the light of the principles enunciated in its case-law (see Ringvold v. Norway, no. 34964/97, § 36, ECHR 2003-II; and Y. v. Norway, no. 56568/00, § 39 ECHR 2003-II (extracts) and its application of those principles in those cases (see respectively at paragraphs 37-42 and 40-47 of the said judgments).

It referred especially to the guiding, as it called them, judgments of this Court in Y v. Norway, (no. 56568/00, ECHR 2003-II (extracts)) and Ringvold v. Norway, (no. 34964/97, ECHR 2003-II), both decided a year earlier, in which it was held that both the procedural and the evidentiary parts of the Norwegian system were not incompatible with Article 6 § 2.

Auszug aus EGMR, 15.05.2008 - 31283/04

These principles were reiterated in Pamela Kay Reeves v. Norway (dec.) no. 4248/02, 08.07.2004; and Tommy Lundkvist v. Sweden (dec.) 48518/99, 13.11.2003.

Those were Commission decisions that stated in no uncertain terms that the difference in the respective standards of proof constitutes a sufficient distinction between a criminal charge on which there has been an acquittal and a civil claim "arising out of the same events." The same principles were, shortly after Y. and Ringvold (cited above), applied in Lundkvist v. Sweden (dec.) no. 48518/99, ECHR, 13 November 2003 and Reeves v. Norway (dec.) no. 4248/02, 8 July 2004.

Auszug aus EGMR, 15.05.2008 - 31283/04

These principles were reiterated in Pamela Kay Reeves v. Norway (dec.) no. 4248/02, 08.07.2004; and Tommy Lundkvist v. Sweden (dec.) 48518/99, 13.11.2003.

Those were Commission decisions that stated in no uncertain terms that the difference in the respective standards of proof constitutes a sufficient distinction between a criminal charge on which there has been an acquittal and a civil claim "arising out of the same events." The same principles were, shortly after Y. and Ringvold (cited above), applied in Lundkvist v. Sweden (dec.) no. 48518/99, ECHR, 13 November 2003 and Reeves v. Norway (dec.) no. 4248/02, 8 July 2004.

Auszug aus EGMR, 15.05.2008 - 31283/04

Thus, the Court considers that, while exoneration from criminal liability ought to stand in the compensation proceedings, it should not preclude the establishment of civil liability to pay compensation arising out of the same facts on the basis of a less strict burden of proof (see, mutatis mutandis, X v. Austria, no. 9295/81, Commission decision of 6 October 1982, Decisions and Reports (DR) 30, p. 227, and C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11882/85, Commission decision of 7 October 1987, DR 54, p. 162).

Indeed, this system of redress for a civil wrong, where on the same facts the defendant has been acquitted of a criminal charge, was comprehensively reviewed in the above cases which relied, among others, on X v. Austria (dec.) no 2995/81, 6 October 1982 and M.C. v UK (dec.) no 11882/85, 7 October 1987.