Volltextveröffentlichung

• Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte

  HILDA HAFSTEINSDOTTIR v. ICELAND

  Art. 5, Art. 5 Abs. 1, Art. 5 Abs. 1 Buchst. e, Art. 41, Art. 10, Art. 10 Abs. 2 MRK
  Violation of Art. 5-1 Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings (englisch)

Verfahrensgang

• EGMR, 22.10.2002 - 40905/98
• EGMR, 08.06.2004 - 40905/98

Wird zitiert von ... (8)Neu Zitiert selbst (4)

• EGMR, 16.02.2000 - 27798/95

  AMANN c. SUISSE

  Auszug aus EGMR, 08.06.2004 - 40905/98

  It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of "lawfulness" set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently accessible and precise to allow the person - if necessary with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Varbanov v. Bulgaria, no. 31365/96, § 51 ECHR 2000-X; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 50, ECHR 2000-II; the Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2735, § 54 and the Amuur v. France judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, pp. 850-51, § 50).
• EGMR, 24.04.1990 - 11801/85

  KRUSLIN c. FRANCE

  Auszug aus EGMR, 08.06.2004 - 40905/98

  Against this background, the Court finds that, at the time of the six disputed events, in one essential respect, namely the duration of the relevant type of detention, the scope and the manner of exercise of the police's discretion were governed by administrative practice alone and, in the absence of precise statutory provisions or case-law, lacked the necessary regulatory framework (see the Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France judgments of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A and -B, respectively §§ 35 and 34).
• EGMR, 04.04.2000 - 26629/95

  WITOLD LITWA c. POLOGNE

  Auszug aus EGMR, 08.06.2004 - 40905/98

  The applicant stressed that, unlike the applicant in the case of Witold Litwa v. Poland (no. 26629/95, ECHR 2000-III), she was not examined by a medical doctor or a health worker upon either arrest or release.
• EGMR, 05.10.2000 - 31365/96

  VARBANOV v. BULGARIA

  Auszug aus EGMR, 08.06.2004 - 40905/98

  It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of "lawfulness" set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently accessible and precise to allow the person - if necessary with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Varbanov v. Bulgaria, no. 31365/96, § 51 ECHR 2000-X; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 50, ECHR 2000-II; the Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2735, § 54 and the Amuur v. France judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, pp. 850-51, § 50).

• EGMR, 29.01.2008 - 13229/03

  Großbritannien (A), Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, Europäische …

  The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is justified only as a last resort where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained (see Witold Litwa, cited above, § 78; Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 51, 8 June 2004; Enhorn v. Sweden, cited above, § 44).
• EGMR, 08.07.2019 - 54012/10

  MIHALACHE v. ROMANIA

  35553/12 and 2 others, § 74, 22 October 2018, and Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland,, no. 40905/98, § 51, 8 June 2004).
• EGMR, 25.01.2005 - 56529/00

  ENHORN c. SUEDE

  It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of "lawfulness" set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently accessible and precise to allow the person - if necessary with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences a given action may entail (see, for example, Varbanov v. Bulgaria, no. 31365/96, § 51, ECHR 2000-X; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 50, ECHR 2000-II; Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2735, § 54; Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports 1996-III, pp. 850-51, § 50; and Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 51, 8 June 2004).

 
• EGMR, 03.02.2011 - 37345/03

  KHARIN v. RUSSIA

  At the same time, it means that Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention does not permit detention of an individual merely because of his alcohol intake (see Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, §§ 61-64, ECHR 2000-III, and Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 42, 8 June 2004).

  [1] Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, ECHR 2000-III; Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, 8 June 2004.

• EGMR, 18.03.2008 - 11036/03

  LADENT v. POLAND

  La privation de liberté est une mesure si grave qu'elle ne se justifie qu'en dernier recours, lorsque d'autres mesures, moins sévères, ont été considérées et jugées insuffisantes pour sauvegarder l'intérêt personnel ou public exigeant la détention (Witold Litwa, précité, § 78 ; Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir c. Islande, no 40905/98, § 51, 8 juin 2004, et Enhorn c. Suède, no 56529/00, § 44, CEDH 2005-I).
• EGMR, 09.04.2013 - 27770/08

  ABDI v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

  The Court recalls that there are a number of previous cases where it has found such a violation of Article 5 and concluded that the finding of a violation should in itself constitute just satisfaction (see, for example, Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 60, 8 June 2004).
• EGMR, 23.09.2008 - 2361/05

  VRENCEV v. SERBIA

  The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is justified only as a last resort where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest (see, in the context of Article 5 § 1 (b), (d) and (e), Saadi v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 67-72; Witold Litwa, cited above, § 78; Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 51, 8 June 2004; Enhorn v. Sweden, no. 56529/00, § 44, ECHR 2005-I).
• EGMR, 12.09.2017 - 6406/15

  R.B. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

  At the same time, Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention does not permit detention of an individual merely because of his alcohol intake (see Petschulies v. Germany, no. 6281/13, § 65, 2 June 2016, Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, §§ 61-64, ECHR 2000-III, and Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 40905/98, § 42, 8 June 2004).