However, in cases as mentioned in paragraph 74 above where the risk of expulsion disappears prior to any decision on the admissibility of the application, the Court has sometimes declared the latter inadmissible because the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Atsaev v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 14021/10, 7 July 2015; Tukhtamurodov v. Russia (dec.), no. 21762/14, 20 January 2015; Andreyev v. Estonia (dec.), no. 42987/09, 22 January 2013; Etanji v. France (dec.), no. 60411/00, 1 March 2005; Pellumbi v. France (dec.), no. 65730/01, 18 January 2005; and Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, 27 August 1992, § 46, Series A no. 241-B).

The same principles apply to extradition cases (see Atsaev v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 14021/10, 7 July 2015).

This does not prevent the applicant from lodging a new application before the Court and from making use of the available procedures, including that under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in respect of any new circumstances, in compliance with the requirements of Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention (see Atsaev v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 14021/10, 7 July 2015).

Elle a adopté la même position dans des affaires où l'arrêté d'expulsion ou d'extradition avait été suspendu sine die ou autrement privé d'effet juridique et où la reprise éventuelle de l'expulsion par les autorités pouvait être attaquée devant les juridictions compétentes (Ghosh c. Allemagne (déc.), no 24017/03, 5 juin 2007 ; et Atsaev c. République tchèque (déc.), no 14021/10, 7 juillet 2015).