Der Gewissenskonflikt zwischen Befolgung des nationalen Rechts und der Achtung eines höheren, von der internationalen Gemeinschaft anerkannten ethischen Grundsatzes ist in Polednová./. Tschechische Republik ((Entsch.), Nr. 2615/10, 21. Juni 2011) beschrieben worden, wo die Schlussfolgerungen von K.-H.W../. Deutschland ([GK], Nr. 37201/97, CEDH 2001-II) bestätigt wurden.

How does this requirement to inform about "procedural rights" square with - if at all - the cardinal rule that everyone is presumed to know the law, whether substantive or procedural, and regardless of whether the law is statutory, judge made (or common law in some jurisdictions) or customary as the case may be? Because of the fact that this rule is so basic and fundamental, one finds only cursory references to it in the jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court, and only in a handful of cases (e.g. Dello Preite v. Italy (no. 15488/89) Commission decision 25 February 1995; E.E. v. Austria (no. 31697/96) 7 September 1999; Polednová v. the Czech Republic (no. 2615/10) 21 June 2011).